Automatically Reinforcing a Game AI by St-Pierre, David L. et al.
1Automatically Reinforcing a Game AI
David L. St-Pierre, Jean-Baptiste Hoock, Jialin Liu, Fabien Teytaud and Olivier Teytaud
Abstract—A recent research trend in Artificial Intelligence (AI)
is the combination of several programs into one single, stronger,
program; this is termed portfolio methods. We here investigate
the application of such methods to Game Playing Programs
(GPPs). In addition, we consider the case in which only one
GPP is available - by decomposing this single GPP into several
ones through the use of parameters or even simply random seeds.
These portfolio methods are trained in a learning phase.
We propose two different offline approaches. The simplest one,
BestArm, is a straightforward optimization of seeds or parame-
ters; it performs quite well against the original GPP, but performs
poorly against an opponent which repeats games and learns. The
second one, namely Nash-portfolio, performs similarly in a “one
game” test, and is much more robust against an opponent who
learns. We also propose an online learning portfolio, which tests
several of the GPP repeatedly and progressively switches to the
best one - using a bandit algorithm.
Index Terms—Monte Carlo Search, Nash Equilibrium, Port-
folios of policies.
I. INTRODUCTION
Portfolios are widely used in many domains; after early
papers in machine learning [1], [2], they are now ubiquitous
in Artificial Intelligence, planning, and combinatorial opti-
mization [3]–[5]. The special case of parameter tuning (close
to our “variants problem” later in the present document) is
widely studied [6], with applications to SAT-solving [7], [8]
or computer vision [9].
Recently, portfolios were also applied in games [10], [11].
A “portfolio” here refers to a family of algorithms which are
candidates for solving a given task. On the other hand, “port-
folio combination” or “combination” refers to the combined
algorithm. Let us introduce a simple combined algorithm. If
we have algorithms pi1, . . . , piK in the portfolio, and if the
combination is pi = pii with probability pi where 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1
and
∑K
i=1 pi = 1 (the random choice is made once and for all
at the beginning of each game), then pi is, by definition, the
portfolio combination with probability distribution p. More-
over, also by definition, it is stationary. Furthermore we will
consider a case in which the probability distribution is not
stationary (namely, UCBT, defined in Section III-B).
Another approach, common in optimization, is “chain-
ing” [12], which means interrupting one program and using its
internal state as a hint for another algorithm. The combination
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can even be “internal” [13], i.e. parts of a solver are used
in other solvers. The most famous applications of portfolios
are in SAT-solving [14]; nowadays, portfolios routinely win
SAT-solving competitions.
In this paper, we focus on portfolios of policies in games,
i.e. portfolios of GPP. Compared to optimization, portfolios
of policies in games or control policies have been less widely
explored, except for e.g. combinations of local controllers by
Fuzzy Systems [15], Voronoi controllers [16] or some case-
based reasoning [17]. These methods are based on “internal”
combinations, using the current state for choosing between
several policies. We here focus on external combinations;
one of the internal programs is chosen at the beginning of a
game, for all games. Such combinations are sometimes termed
“ensemble methods”; however, we simply consider proba-
bilistic combinations of existing policies, the simplest case
of ensemble methods. This is an extension of a preliminary
work [18].
To the best of our knowledge, there is not much literature
on combining policies for games when only one program is
available. The closest past work might be Gaudel et al. [19],
which proposed a combination of opening books, using tools
similar to those we propose in Section III-A for combining
policies.
A. Main goal of the present paper
The main contribution of this paper is to propose a me-
thodology that can generically improve the performance of
policies without actually changing the policies themselves,
except through the policy’s options or the policy’s random
seed. Incidentally, we establish that the random seed can
have a significant contribution to the strength of an artificial
intelligence, just because random seeds can decide the answer
to some critical moves as soon as the original randomized
GPP has a significant probability of finding the right move. In
addition, while a fixed random seed cannot be strong against
an adaptive opponent, our policies are more diversified (see
the Nash approach) or adaptive (see our UCBT-portfolio).
Our approach is particularly relevant when the computa-
tional power is limited, because the computational overhead
is very limited. Our main goal is to answer the following
question: how can we, without development and without
increasing the online computational cost, significantly increase
the performance of a GPP in games ?
B. Outline of the present paper
We study 2 different portfolio problems:
• The first test case is composed of a set of random seeds
for a given GPP. By considering many possible seeds,
we get deterministic variants of the original stochastic
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Fig. 1: Method used for generating a portfolio of deterministic programs from a randomized one (left part of the figure) and
combining them back into one single randomized program better than its original self. The UCBT portfolio proposed in the
present paper does not directly fit in this figure because it depends on earlier games: it is non stationary.
GPP. We restrict our attention to combinations which
are a fixed probability distribution over the portfolio: we
propose a combination such that, at the beginning of the
game, one of the deterministic GPPs (equivalently, one of
the seeds) is randomly drawn and then blindly applied.
Hence, the problem boils down to finding a probability
distribution over the set of random seeds such that it pro-
vides a strong strategy. We test the obtained probability
distribution on seeds versus (i) the GPP with uniformly
randomly drawn seeds (i.e. the standard, original, version
of the GPP) and (ii) a stronger GPP, defined later, termed
“exploiter” (Section V-A1).
• In the second case, we focus on different parameteriza-
tions of a same program, so that we keep the spirit of the
main goal above. The goal here is to find a probability
distribution over these parameterizations. We will assess
the performance of the obtained probability distribution
against the different options.
A combination can be constructed either offline [20] or
online [21], [22]. In this paper, we use three different methods
for combining several policies:
• In the first one, termed Nash-portfolio, we compute a
Nash Equilibrium (NE) over the portfolio of policies in
an offline fashion. This approach computes a distribution
such that it generates a robust (not exploitable) agent.
Further tests show a generalization ability for this method.
• In the second one, termed UCBT-portfolio, we choose an
element in the portfolio, online, using a bandit approach.
This portfolio learns a specialized distribution, adaptively,
given a stationary opponent. This approach is very good
at exploiting such opponent.
• The third one, Best Arm, is the limit case of UCBT-
portfolio. It somehow cheats by selecting the best option
against its opponent, i.e. it uses prior knowledge. This
is what UCBT will do asymptotically, if it is allowed to
play enough games.
These concepts are explained in Fig. 1. There are important re-
lated works using teams of programs [23]–[25]. The specificity
of the present work is to get an improvement with a portfolio
of programs which are indeed obtained from a single original
program - i.e. we get an improvement “for free”, in terms of
development.
The rest of the paper is divided as follows. Section II
formalizes the problem. Section III describes our approach.
Section IV details the experimental setup. Section V presents
the results. Section VI shows robustness elements. Section
VII presents simplified variants of our algorithms, performing
similarly to the original ones. Section VIII concludes.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this section, we formalize the notion of policies, ad-
versarial portfolios, and the framework of matrix games. We
also introduce the concepts of overfitting, exploitation and
generalization.
A. Policies
We consider policies, i.e. game playing programs
(GPP [24]), and tools (portfolios) for combining/selecting
them.
When a GPP is stochastic, it can be made deterministic by
choosing a fixed seed at the beginning of the game. From
a stochastic pi, we can therefore build several GPP pi1, pi2,
. . . corresponding to seeds 1, 2, . . . In the case of our portfolio,
and in all experiments and algorithms in the present paper, the
choice of the seed is done once and for all, when a new game
starts.
3B. Matrix games
In this paper we only consider finite constant-sum adver-
sarial games (i.e. if one player wins the other loses, constant-
sum and adversarial are synonyms) with a reward that is
only available at the end of the game. To properly define
our algorithms in the following sections, let us introduce
the concept of constant-sum matrix game. Without loss of
generality, we define the concept of 1-sum matrix game instead
of an arbitrary constant.
Consider a matrix K×K ′, with values in [0, 1]. This matrix
models a game as follows:
• Simultaneously and privately:
– Player 1 chooses i ∈ {1, . . . ,K}.
– Player 2 chooses j ∈ {1, . . . ,K ′}.
• Then they receive rewards as follows:
– Player 1 receives reward Mi,j .
– Player 2 receives reward 1−Mi,j .
A pure strategy (for player 1) consists in playing a given,
fixed i ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, with probability 1. A mixed strategy,
or simply a strategy, consists in playing i with probability pi,
where
∑K
i=1 pi = 1 and ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, 1 ≥ pi ≥ 0. Pure
and mixed strategies for player 2 are defined similarly. Pure
strategies are a special case of mixed strategies.
In the general stationary case, Player 1 chooses row i with
probability pi and Player 2 chooses column j with probability
qj . It is known since [26], [27] that there exist strategies p and
q for the first and second player respectively, such that
∀(p′, q′), p′Mq ≤ pMq ≤ pMq′. (1)
p and q are not necessarily unique, but the value v = pMq
is unique (this is a classical fact, which can be derived from
Eq. 1) and it is, by definition, the value of the game. The ex-
ploitability of a strategy p′ for the first player is exploit1(p′) =
v − minq p′Mq. When exploit1(p′) = 0, it is equivalent to
the fact that p′ = p. The exploitability of a strategy q′ for
the second player is exploit2(q′) = maxp pMq′ − v and it
verifies similar properties. The exploitability of a strategy is
always non-negative and quantifies the robustness of a strategy.
The exploitability of a GPP which can play both as Player 1
and as Player 2 is the average of its exploitabilities as Player
1 and its exploitability as Player 2.
C. Overfitting, exploitation & generalization
Overfitting in a game sense refers to the poor performance
of a GPP P when P seems to be strong according to a
given criterion which was used in the design of P . For
instance, a GPP built through trials and errors by accepting
any modifications which increase the success rate against a
GPP X might have an excellent success rate against X , but a
poor winning rate against another program Y . This is a case
of overfitting.
This is important when automatic tuning is applied, and
in particular for portfolio methods when working on random
seeds. Selecting good random seeds for Player 1, by analyzing
a matrix of results for various seeds for Player 1 and Player 2,
might be excellent in terms of performance against the seeds
used for Player 2 in the data; but for a proper assessment of
the performance against the original randomized program, we
should use games played against other seeds for Player 2. The
performance against the seeds used in the data is referred to
as an empirical performance, whereas the performance against
new seeds is referred to as the performance in generaliza-
tion [28]. Only the performance in generalization is a proper
assessment of performance; we provide such results.
In games, overfitting is related to exploitability. Exploitabil-
ity is an indicator of overfitting; when we build a GPP by some
machine learning method, we can check, by the exploitability
measure, whether it is good more generally than just against
the opponents which have been used during the learning
process.
In practice, exploitability defined as above is hard to mea-
sure. Therefore, we often use simpler proxies, e.g. the worst
performance against a set of opponents. We say that a program
A “exploits” a program B when A has a great success rate
against B, much higher than the success rate of most programs
against B - and we say that a family A exploits a program
B when there exists A ∈ A which exploits B. The existence
of A which “exploits” B suggests an overfitting issue in the
design of B.
III. APPROACHES
Section III-A proposes a method for combining policies
offline, given a set of policies for Player 1 and a set of policies
for Player 2. Section III-B proposes a method for combining
policies online, given a portfolio of policies for player 1 and
a stationary opponent.
A. Offline learning: Nash-portfolios and Best Arm
Consider two players P1 and P2, playing some game (not
necessarily a matrix game). P1 is Black, P2 is White. Assume
that P1 has a portfolio of K policies. Assume that P2 has
a portfolio of K ′ policies. Then, we can construct a static
combination of these policies by solving (i.e. finding a Nash
equilibrium of) the matrix game associated to the matrix
M , with Mi,j the winning rate of the ith policy of P1
against the jth policy of P2. Solving this 1-sum matrix game
provides p1, . . . , pK and q1, . . . , qK′ , probabilities, and the
combination consists in playing, for P1, the ith policy with
probability pi and, for P2, the jth policy with probability qj .
Such a combination will be termed here a Nash-portfolio. By
construction,
• the Nash-portfolio can play both as Black and as White
(P1 and P2);
• the Nash-portfolio does not change over time but is, in
the general case, stochastic.
Let us define more formally the Nash-portfolio and the
Best Arm portfolio.
Definition: Given a set S1 of K policies for Black and a
set S2 of K ′ policies for White. Define Mi,j the winning rate
of the ith strategy in S1 against the jth strategy in S2. Then
the strategy which plays:
• as Black, the ith strategy in S1 with probability pi;
4• as White, the jth strategy in S2 with probability qj;
is termed a Nash-portfolio of (S1, S2) if (p, q) is a solution
of Eq. 1.
The strategy playing the Ith strategy in S1 with probability
1 when playing Black, and playing the J th strategy in S2 with
probability 1 when playing White, is a Best Arm portfolio if
I maximizes
K′∑
j=1
MI,j (2)
and J minimizes
K∑
i=1
Mi,J . (3)
The strategy playing the ith strategy in S1 as Black (resp. in
S2 as White) with probability 1/K (resp. 1/K ′) is the uniform
portfolio.
Best Arm can be seen as the best response to the uniform
policy. In both cases, Nash-portfolio and Best Arm, there is
no uniqueness.
The Nash equilibrium can be found using an exact solving,
in polynomial time, by linear programming [29]. It can also
be found approximately and iteratively, in sublinear time, as
shown by [30], [31]; the EXP3 algorithm is classical for doing
so.
From the properties of Nash equilibria, we deduce that the
Nash-portfolio has the following properties:
• It depends on a family of policies for player 1 and on a
family of policies for player 2. It is therefore based on a
training, by offline learning.
• It is optimal (for player 1) among all mixed strategies
(i.e. stochastic combinations of policies in the portfolio
of player 1), in terms of both
– worst case among the pure strategies in the portfolio
of player 2;
– worst case among the mixed strategies over the
portfolio of player 2.
• It is not necessarily uniquely defined.
In optimization settings, it is known [32] that having a
somehow “orthogonal” portfolio of algorithms, i.e. algorithms
as different from each other as possible, is a good solution for
making the combination efficient. It is however difficult, in the
context of policies, to know in advance if two algorithms are
orthogonal - we can however see, a posteriori, which strategies
have positive probabilities in the obtained combination.
B. Online learning: UCBT-Portfolio
Section III-A assumed that S1 and S2, two sets of strategies,
are available and that we want to define a combination of
policies in S1 (resp. in S2). A different point of view consists
in adapting online the probabilities pi and qi, against a fixed
opponent. We propose the following algorithm. We define this
approach in the case of Black, having K policies at hand.
The approach is similar for White. It is directly inspired by
the bandit literature [33], [34], and, more precisely, by Upper-
Confidence-Bounds-Tuned (UCBT) [35], with parameters op-
timized for our problem:
• Define ni = 0, ri = 0, for i ∈ {1, . . . ,K}.
• For each iteration t ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . }.
– compute for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,K} score(i) =
min(1, ri/ni +
1
100
√
C log(4tp)/ni
+ 16100 log(4t
p)/ni). using X/0 = +∞ (even for
X = 0), p = 2.1 and C = 2 (UCBT, i.e. UCB-
Tuned, formula).
– choose k maximizing score(k).
– play a game using algorithm k in the portfolio.
– if it is a win, rk ← rk + 1.
– nk ← nk + 1.
Definition. We refer to this adaptive player as UCBT-
Portfolio, or Bandit-Portfolio.
IV. SETTINGS
This section presents the settings used in our experiments.
Section IV-A details the notion of portfolio of random seeds
for 4 different games (Go, Chess, Havannah, Batoo). Section
IV-B explains the context a portfolio of parameterizations for
the game of Go.
A. Portfolio of Random Seeds
First, let us explain the principle of GPPs that just differ by
their random seeds. We first apply the portfolio approach in
this case. Without loss of generality, we will focus on the case
where K = K ′. The K GPPs for Black and the K GPPs for
White use random seed 1, 2, . . . , K respectively. Let us see
what our Nash-portfolio and other portfolios become in such
a setting. We define Mi,j = 1 if, with random seed i, Black
wins against White with random seed j. Otherwise, Mi,j = 0.
Importantly, the number of games to be played for getting this
matrix M , necessary for learning the Nash-portfolio is K2.
This is because there is no need for playing multiple games,
since fixing the random seed makes the result deterministic.
Thus, we just play one game for each (i, j) ∈ {1, . . . ,K}2.
Then, we compute (p, q), one of the Nash equilibria of the
matrix game M . This learns simultaneously the Nash-portfolio
for Black and for White. Using this matrix M , we can also
apply:
• the uniform portfolio, simply choosing randomly uni-
formly among the seeds;
• the Best Arm portfolio, choosing (I, J) optimizing Eqs.
2 and 3 and using I as a seed for Black and J as a seed
for White;
• the UCBT-portfolio, which is the only non-stationary
portfolio in the present paper.
We use 4 different testbeds in this category (portfolio of
random seeds): Go, Chess, Havannah, Batoo. These games are
all deterministic (Batoo has an initial important simultaneous
move, namely the choice of a base-build, i.e. some initial
stones - but we do not keep the partially observable stone,
see details below).
1) The game of Go: The first testbed is the game of Go for
which the best programs are Monte-Carlo Tree Search (MCTS)
with specialized Monte Carlo simulations and patterns in the
tree. The Black player starts. The game of Go is an ancient
5oriental game, invented in China probably at least 2 500 years
ago. It is still a challenge for GPP, as even though MCTS [36]
revolutionized the domain, the best programs are still not at the
professional level. Go is known as a very deep game [37].For
the purpose of our analysis, we use a 9x9 Go board.
We use GnuGo’s random seed for having several GnuGo
variants. The random seed of GnuGo makes the program
deterministic, by fixing the seed used in all random parts of
the algorithm. We define 32 variants, using “GnuGo –level 10
–random-seed k” with k ∈ {1, . . . , 32}. In other words, we
use a MCTS with 80 000 simulations per move, as GnuGo
uses, by default, 8 000 simulations per level.
2) Chess: The second testbed is Chess. There are 2 players,
Black and White. The White player starts. Chess is a two-
player strategy board game played on a chessboard, a check-
ered game board with 64 squares arranged in an 8-by-8 grid.
As in Go, this game is deterministic and full information. For
the game of Chess, the main algorithm is alpha-beta [38], yet
here we use a vanilla MCTS. We define 100 variants for the
portfolios of random seeds (giving a matrix M of size 100-
by-100), using a MCTS with 1 000 simulations per move and
enhanced by an evaluation function. Our implementation is
roughly ELO 1600 on game servers, i.e. amateur level.
3) Havannah: The third testbed is the game of Havannah.
There are 2 players in this game: Black and White. The
Black player starts. Havannah is an abstract board game
invented by Christian Freeling. It is best played on a base-
10 hexagonal board, i.e. 10 hexes (cells) to a side. Havannah
belongs to the family of games commonly called connection
games; its relatives include Hex and TwixT. This game is also
deterministic with full information. For the game of Havannah,
a vanilla MCTS with rapid action value estimates [39] provides
excellent performance. We define 100 variants for the portfolio
of random seeds (giving a matrix M of size 100-by-100), using
a MCTS with 1 000 simulations per move.
4) Batoo: The fourth testbed is a simplified version of
Batoo. Batoo is related to the game of Go, but contains 2
features which are not fully observable:
• Each player, once per game, can put a hidden stone
instead of a standard stone.
• At the beginning, each player, simultaneously and pri-
vately, puts a given number of stones on the board. These
stones, termed “base build”, define the initial position.
When the game starts, these stones are revealed to the
opponent and colliding stones are removed.
We consider a simplified Batoo, without the hidden stones -
but we keep the initial, simultaneous, choice of base build. As
in Go, this game is deterministic. Once the initial position of
the stones is chosen for both player a normal game of 9x9 Go
is executed using a GnuGo level 10.
B. Portfolio of parameterizations: variants of GnuGo
We consider the problem of combining several variants
(each variant corresponds to a set of options which are
enabled) of a GPP for the game of Go.
Our matrix M is a 32×32 matrix, where Mi,j is the winning
rate of the ith variant of GnuGo (as black) against the jth
variant of GnuGo (as white). We consider all combinations
of 5 options of GnuGo, hence 32= 25 variants. In short, the
first option is ‘cosmic-go’, which focuses on playing at the
center. The second option is the use of fuseki (global opening
book). The third option is ‘mirror’, which consists in mirroring
your opponent at the early stages of the game. The fourth
option is the large scale attack, which evaluates if a large attack
across several groups is possible. The fifth option is the break-
in. It consists in breaking the game analysis into territories
that require deeper tactical reading and are impossible to read
otherwise. It revises the territory valuations. Further details on
the 5 options are listed on our website [40].
As opposed to Section IV-A, we need more than one
evaluation in order to get Mi,j , because the outcome of a game
between 2 different GPP is not deterministic. For the purpose
of this paper, we build the matrix Mi,j offline by repeating
each game (i, j) 289 times, leading to a standard deviation at
most 0.03 per entry.
For this part, experiments are performed on the convenient
7x7 framework, with MCTS having 300 simulations per move
- this setting is consistent with the mobile devices setting. We
refer to the ith algorithm for Black as BAIi (Black Artificial
Intelligence # i), and WAIj is the jth algorithm for White.
V. EXPERIMENTS
In this section we evaluate the performance of our ap-
proaches across different settings.
Section V-A focuses on the problem of computing a prob-
ability distribution in an offline manner for the games defined
in Section IV. We evaluate the scores of the Nash-portfolio
approach and of the Best Arm approach. We also include
the uniform portfolio. In the case of a portfolio of random
seeds, the uniform portfolio is indeed the original algorithm.
Section V-B focuses on the problem of learning a probability
distribution in an online manner to play against a specific
opponent for the games defined in Section IV. We evaluate
the learning ability of our UCBT-portfolio.
A. Learning Offline
In this section we present an analysis of the different offline
portfolios across the testbeds. Table I shows the performance
of the portfolios. The column V presents the value of the
matrix game M . The following columns are self-explanatory
where 1 indicates the player with the initiative and 2 indicates
the player without.
We briefly describe the results in the four portfolios of
random seeds as follows:
• For the game of Go, the number of seeds with positive
probability in the Nash-portfolio is 11 for Black and
9 for White, i.e. roughly 13 of the random seeds.Nash-
portfolio outperforms Best Arm, which in turn wins
against Uniform.
• In Chess, the number of seeds with positive probability
in the Nash equilibrium is 34 for White and 37 for Black,
i.e. roughly 13 of the random seeds. The best arm strategy
is easily beaten by the Nash portfolio.
6TABLE I: Performance Portfolio Analysis. The Nash-portfolio clearly outperforms the uniform one (which is the original
algorithm), but not necessarily the simple BestArm algorithm; BestArm has some weaknesses in terms of exploitability (as
discussed later, in Fig. 2(b)) but it is not necessarily weaker than Nash for direct games one against each other.
V Nash(1) vs Unif(2) Nash(2) vs Unif(1) Nash(2) vs Best Arm(1) Nash(1) vs Best Arm(2)
Go 54.16% 68.51% 38.80% 55.76% 66.62%
Chess 54.52% 59.16% 50.29% 80.31% 86.07%
Havannah 55.36% 58.10% 52.51% 72.69% 75.75%
Batoo 50.11% 70.69% 34.01% 56.56% 67.95%
Variants 61.21% 65.57% 52.37% 61.21% 70.52%
• For the game of Havannah, the number of seeds with
positive probability in the Nash-portfolio is 36 for White
and 34 for Black, i.e. roughly 13 of the random seeds are
selected. The best arm strategy is outperformed by the
Nash portfolio.
• For the game of Batoo, the number of seeds with positive
probability in the Nash-portfolio is 11 for Black and 14
for White. The uniform strategy is seemingly quite easily
beaten by the Nash-portfolio or the Best Arm-portfolio.
These descriptive statistics are extracted in the learning step,
i.e. on the training data, namely the matrix M . They provide
insights, in particular around the fact that no seed dominates,
but a clean validation requires a test in generalization, as
discussed in Section II-C. Performances in generalization are
discussed in Section V-A1.
We now consider the case of “Variants”, which refers to
the case in which we do not work on random seeds, but on
variants of GnuGo, as explained in Section IV-B; the goal
is to “combine” optimally the variants, among randomized
choices between variants. For Variants, in the NE, the number
of selected options (i.e. options with positive probability) is 4
for Black and also 4 for White, i.e. 18 of the variants are in
the Nash. This means that no option could dominate all others.
The uniform strategy is quite easily beaten by the Nash as well
as the best arm strategy. The Best Arm portfolio is beaten
by the Nash portfolio. This last point is interesting: it shows
that selecting the variant which is the best for the average
winning rate against other variants (this is what Best Arm
does), leads to a combined variant which is weaker than the
Nash combination.
1) Generalization ability of offline Portfolio: We now
switch to the performance in generalization of the Nash and
Best Arm approach. In other words, we test whether it is
possible to use a distribution computed over a portfolio of
policies (learned against a given set of opponent policies)
against new opponent policies that are not part of the initial
matrix. The idea is to select a submatrix of size K (learning
set), compute our probability distribution for this submatrix
using either Nash or Best Arm and make it play against
the remainder of the seeds (validation set). We restrict our
analysis to the setting presented in Section IV-A. We focus on
the 4 portfolios with random seeds. We test policies (Nash-
portfolio, uniform portfolio, Best Arm) against an opponent
which is not in the training set in order to evaluate whether
our approach is robust.
The x-axis represents the number of policies K considered
for each player (hence a matrix M of type K×K). The y-axis
shows the win rate of the different approaches
• against an opponent that uses the uniform strategy (this is
tested with independently drawn random seeds, not used
in the matrix used for learning);
• against an “exploiter”; by exploiter, we mean an algo-
rithm which selects, among the N > K considered seeds
which are not used in the learning set, the best performing
one. Obviously, this opponent is somehow cheating; he
knows which probability distribution you have, and uses
it for choosing his seed among the M = N −K seeds
which are considered in the experiment but not used in
the learning. This is a proxy for the robustness; some
algorithms are better than other for resisting to such
opponents who use some knowledge about you.
Figure 2 summarizes the results for the game of Go. Figure
2(a) presents the results of 2 different approaches (Nash and
Best Arm) versus the uniform baseline. All experiments are
reproduced 10 000 times (5 000 times for the Black player
and 5 000 times for the White player) and standard deviations
are smaller than 0.007.
Figure 2(b) shows the difference between a Nash approach
and a Best Arm approach in terms of exploitability.
From Figure 2(a) we can observe that there is a clear
advantage to use either the Nash or the Best Arm approach
when facing a new set of policies. Moreover, as expected,
as the size of the initial matrix grows, the winning rates of
both Nash and Best Arm increase when compared to the
baseline. It is interesting to note that there is a sharp increase
when the submatrix size is relatively small (between 3 and 7).
Afterwards, the size of the submatrix has a moderate impact on
the performance until most options are included in the matrix.
It does not come as a surprise that the approach Best Arm
performs slightly better than the Nash against a uniformly
random opponent. The Best Arm approach is particularly
well suited to play against such an opponent. However, the
Best Arm approach is easily exploitable. This behavior is
shown in Figure 2(b).
From Figure 2(b) it clearly appears that Best Arm is a
strategy very easy to exploit. Thus, even if Figure 2(a) shows
that the use of the Best Arm approach outperforms Nash
versus the uniform baseline, Nash is a much more resilient
strategy.
Chess: Figure 3 summarizes the results for the game of
Chess. Figure 3(a) presents the results of 2 different ap-
proaches versus the uniform baseline. All experiments are
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(a) Winning rate of 2 offline portfolios (namely Nash and Best Arm)
against the uniform baseline, tested in generalization. X-axis: number K
of policies considered in each portfolio. Y-axis: win rates. Experiments
reproduced 10 000 times, standard deviations < 10−2. Interpretation: we
outperform (in generalization) the original GnuGo just by changing the
probability distribution of random seeds.
0 5 10 15 20 25
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
Submatrix Size
Lo
si
ng
 R
at
e
 
 
Nash
Best Arm
(b) Losing rate of the Nash and Best Arm policies against the exploiter
(M = 32 − K). X-axis: number K of considered seeds in the learning
phase. Y-axis: loss rates. Experiments reproduced 100 times. We see that a
simple learning (the “exploiter” easily crushes Best Arm, whereas Nash
resists to this difficult setting, in particular with a large learning set (i.e.
a large learning matrix - and the rightmost point corresponds to 24 seeds,
which therefore requires 576 games for training).
Fig. 2: Game of Go: performance against the original GPP (left) and exploitability of Nash and BestArm respectively.
reproduced 10 000 times (5 000 times for the Black player and
5 000 times for the White player) and standard deviations are
smaller than 10−2. Figure 3(b) shows the difference between
a Nash approach and a Best Arm approach in terms of
exploitability.
From Figure 3(a) we can observe, as it was the case
in the game of Go, that there is a clear advantage to use
either the Nash or the Best Arm approach when facing a
new set of policies. As the size of the initial matrix grows,
the winning rates of both Nash and Best Arm increase,
in generalization, when compared to the baseline. Also, we
observe that the shape of the curve for the Nash approach is
quite similar to the one seen in the game of Go. However,
the Best Arm approach keeps increasing almost linearly
throughout the entire x-axis.
From Figure 3(b) it clearly appears that Best Arm is a
strategy very easy to exploit. Thus, while Figure 3(a) shows
that the use of the Best Arm approach outperforms Nash
versus the uniform baseline, Nash is a much more resilient
strategy.
Havannah: Figure 4 summarizes the results for the game of
Havannah. Figure 4(a) presents the results of 2 offline portfolio
algorithms (namely Nash and Best Arm) versus the uniform
baseline. Same setting as for chess (number of experiments
and same bound on the standard deviation).Figure 4(b) shows
the difference between a Nash approach and a Best Arm
approach in terms of exploitability.
From Figure 4(a) we can observe, as it was the case in the
game of Go, that there is a clear advantage to use either the
Nash or the Best Arm approach when facing a new set of
policies. As the size of the initial matrix grows, the winning
rates of both Nash and Best Arm increase when compared
to the baseline.
From Figure 4(b) it clearly appears that Best Arm is a
strategy very easy to exploit. Thus, even if Figure 4(a) shows
that the use of the Best Arm approach outperforms Nash
versus the uniform baseline, Nash is a much more resilient
strategy.
The performance of Nash and more especially Best Arm
increase significantly as the size of the submatrix grows. This
is in sharp contrast with the 2 previous games. In the case
of Havannah, the sharpest gain is towards the end of the x-
axis, which suggests that further gains would be possible with
bigger matrix.
Batoo: Figure 5 summarizes the results for the game of Ba-
too. Figure 5(a) presents the results of 2 different approaches
versus the uniform baseline. Same setting as for Chess and
Havannah.Figure 5(b) shows the difference between a Nash
approach and a Best Arm approach in terms of exploitability.
The x-axis represents the number of policies considered. The
y-axis shows the loss rates. All experiments are reproduced
100 times.
From Figure 5(a) we can observe, as it was the case in the
game of Go, that there is a clear advantage to use either the
Nash or the Best Arm approach when facing a new set of
policies. As the size of the initial matrix grows, the winning
rates (in generalization) of both Nash and Best Arm increase
when compared to the baseline.
From Figure 5(b) it clearly appears that Best Arm is a
strategy very easy to exploit. Thus, though Figure 5(a) shows
that the use of the Best Arm approach outperforms Nash
versus the uniform baseline, Nash is a much more resilient
strategy.
Conclusion: The performance of Nash and Best Arm
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(a) Winning rate of 2 offline portfolios (Nash and Best Arm) against
the uniform baseline in terms of generalization ability. Axes, number of
experiments and standard deviation as in Fig. 2. We see that we have, for
this Chess playing program, obtained a portfolio which is better than the
original algorithm, just by modifying the distribution of random seeds.
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(b) Losing rate of the Nash and Best Arm policies against the exploiter
(M = 100−K). Same axes as Fig. 2.
Fig. 3: Game of Chess: performance against the original GPP (left) and exploitability of Nash and BestArm respectively.
increase steadily as the size K of the submatrix grows.
Also, we observe a behavior similar to the game of Go. The
simultaneous action nature of the first move does not seem to
impact the general efficiency of our approach.
B. Learning Online
The purpose of this section is twofold:
• Propose an adaptive algorithm, built automatically buy
the random seed trick as in the case of Nash-Portfolio.
• Show the resilience of our offline-learning algorithms,
namely Nash-Portfolio and Best Arm, against this
adaptive algorithm - in particular, this shows a weakness
of Best Arm in terms of exploitability/overfitting.
Here we present the losing rate of UCBT (see Section
III-B) against 3 baselines. The purpose is to evaluate whether
learning a strategy online against a specific unknown opponent
(baselines) can be efficiently done.
The first baseline is the Nash equilibrium (label Nash
and previously defined in Section III. The second baseline
is the uniform player (label Unif ) which consists in playing
uniformly each option of the bandit. The third baseline consists
in playing a single deterministic strategy (only one random
seed) regardless of the opponent.
Go: Figure 6(a) (and Figure 6(b)) shows the learning of
UCBT for the Black player (and White respectively) for the
game of Go.
First and foremost, as the number of iterations grows, there
is a clear learning against both Nash and Unif baselines.
We see that (i) UCBT eventually reaches, against Nash-
portfolio, approximately the value of the game for each player,
(ii) the Nash-portfolio is among the most difficult opponents
(the curve decreases slowly only). We can also observe from
Figures 6(a) and 6(b) that against the Unif baseline UCBT
learns a strategy that outperforms this opponent.
When it plays as the Black player, it takes less than 27 (128)
games to learn the correct strategy and win with a 100 % ratio
against every single deterministic variant. As the White player,
it is even faster with only 25 games required to always win.
Also, it is without surprise that the losing rate is lower when
UCBT is the first player.
Chess: Figure 6(c) (and Figure 6(d)) shows the learning of
UCBT for the Black player (and White respectively) for the
game of Chess.
Again, as the number of iterations grows, there is a clear
learning against both Nash and Unif baselines. UCBT
eventually reaches, against Nash-portfolio, almost the value of
the game for each player. Moreover, by looking at the slope
of the curves, we see that the Nash-portfolio is among the
most difficult opponents. We can also observe from Figures
6(c) and 6(d) that against the Unif baseline UCBT learns a
strategy that outperforms this opponent. This is consistent with
the theory behind UCBT.
When it plays as the Black player, it takes less than 27
games to learn the correct strategy and win with a 100 %
ratio against every single deterministic variant. As the White
player, it is even faster with only 26 games required to always
win. In Section V-A we observe that the uniform strategy for
the game of Chess is much more difficult to play against than
the uniform strategy for the game of Go. Figures 6(c) and
6(c) corroborate this results as the slope of learning against
the uniform strategy is less pronounced in Chess than in Go.
Havannah: Figure 7(a) (resp. Figure 7(b)) shows the learn-
ing of UCBT for the Black player (resp. White player) for the
game of Havannah.
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(a) Winning rate of 2 offline portfolios (Nash and Best Arm) against the
uniform baseline in generalization. Same setting as in Fig. 2. We see that we
get a program which outperforms the original Havannah artificial intelligence
just by changing the probability distribution of random seeds.
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(b) Losing rate of the Nash and Best Arm policies against the exploiter
(M = 100−K). Same setting as in Fig. 2.
Fig. 4: Game of Havannah: performance against the original GPP (left) and exploitability of Nash and BestArm
respectively.
Once more, as the number of iterations grows, there is
a clear learning against both Nash and Unif baselines.
Moreover, by looking at the slope of the curves, we see that
the Nash-portfolio is harder to exploit than other opponents,
and in particular than the original algorithm, i.e. the uniform
random seed. We can also observe from Figures 7(a) and
7(b) that against the Unif baseline UCBT learns a strategy
that outperforms this opponent. However, it takes about 26
iterations before the learning really kicks in.
When it plays as the Black player, it takes less than 25
games to learn the correct strategy and win with a 100 %
ratio against every single deterministic variant. As the White
player, it is even faster with only 25 games required to always
win.
Batoo: Figure 7(c) and Figure 7(d) show the learning of
UCBT for the Black and White players respectively for the
game of simplified Batoo.
Even though this game contains a critical simultaneous
action at the beginning, the results are quite similar to the
previous games. As the number of iterations grows, there
is a clear learning against both Nash and Unif baselines.
Moreover, by looking at the slope of the curves, we see that
the Nash-portfolio is among the most difficult opponents - it
is harder to exploit than the original algorithm with uniform
seed. We can also observe from Figure 7 that against the
Unif baseline UCBT learns a strategy that outperforms this
opponent.
When it plays as the Black player, it takes less than 27
games to learn the correct strategy and win with a 100 %
ratio against every single deterministic variant. As the White
player, it is even faster with only 27 games required to always
win.
We now switch to UCBT applied to the Variants problem.
The losing rates of the recommended variant are presented in
Fig. 8.
First and foremost, as the number of iterations grows, there
is a clear learning against both Nash and Unif baselines. We
see that (i) UCBT eventually reaches, against Nash-portfolio,
approximately the value of the game for each player (ii) the
Nash-portfolio is among the most difficult opponents (the
curve decreases slowly only). We can also observe from Figure
8 that against the Unif baseline UCBT learns a strategy that
outperforms his opponent.
1) Conclusions: UCBT can learn very efficiently against
a fixed deterministic opponent; this confirms its ability for
eTeaching - a human opponent can learned her weaknesses
by playing against a UCBT program. UCBT, after learning,
performs better than Nash-portfolio against Uniform, showing
that even against a stochastic opponent it can perform well, and
in particular better than the Nash. This is not a contradiction
with the Nash optimality; the Nash portfolio is optimal in
an agnostic sense, whereas UCBT tries to overfit its opponent
and can therefore exploit it better.
2) Generalization ability of online portfolios: We validated
offline portfolios both against the GPPs used in the training,
and against other GPPs. For online learning, the generalization
ability does not have the same meaning, because online
learning is precisely aimed at exploiting a given opponent.
Nonetheless, we can consider what happens if we online learn
random seeds against the uniform portfolio, and then play
games against the original GPP.
The answer can be derived mathematically. From the con-
sistency of UCBT, we deduce that UCBT-portfolio, against
a randomized seed, will converge to Best Arm. Therefore,
the asymptotic winning rate of UCBT-portfolio when learning
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(a) Winning rate of 2 offline portfolios against the uniform baseline in
generalization. We see that we have obtained a version of our Batoo playing
program which outperforms the original program, just by modifying the
probability distribution over random seeds.
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(b) Losing rate of the Nash and Best Arm policies against the exploiter
(M = 100−K). Same setting as in Fig. 2.
Fig. 5: Game of Batoo: performance against the original GPP (left) and exploitability of Nash and BestArm respectively.
against the original GPP, using a training against a fixed
number of random seeds, is the same as shown for Best Arm
in Section V-A: 62% in Go, 54% in Havannah, 53.5% in
Chess, 71% in Batoo. In the case of Batoo we see that this
generalization success rate is better than the empirical success
rate from Fig. 5; this is not surprising as we consider the
asymptotic success rate whereas we clearly see on Figure 5
that the asymptotic rate is not yet reached.
VI. ROBUSTNESS: THE TRANSFER TO OTHER OPPONENTS
Results above were performed in a classical machine learn-
ing setting, i.e. with cross-validation; we now check the
transfer, i.e. the fact that we improve a GPP not only in terms
of winning rate against the baseline version, but also in terms
of better performance when we test its performance
• by playing against another, distinct, GPP;
• by analysis with a reference GPP, stronger thanks to huge
thinking time.
This means, that whereas previous sections have obtained
results such as
“When our algorithm takes A as baseline GPP, the boosted
counterpart A’ outperforms A by XXX % winning rate. (with
XXX>50%)”
we get results such as:
“When our algorithm takes A as baseline GPP, the boosted
counterpart A’ outperforms A in the sense that the winning rate
of A’ against B is greater than the winning rate of A against
B, for each B in a family { B1, B2, . . . , Bk } of programs
different from A.”
A. Transfer to GnuGo
We applied BestArm to GnuGo, a well known AI for the
game of Go, with Monte Carlo tree search and a budget of
TABLE II: Performance (winning rate) of BestArm-Gnugo-
MCTS against various GnuGo-default programs, compared
to the performance of the default Gnugo-MCTS. The results
are for GnuGo-MCTS playing as Black vs GnuGo-classical
playing as White, and the games are completely independent of
the learning phase - which use only Gnugo-MCTS. Results are
averaged over 1000 games. All results in 5x5, komi 6.5, with
a learning over a 100x100 matrix of games played between
100 random seeds for Black and 100 random seeds for White.
Opponent Performance of Performance of the
BestArm original algorithm
with randomized random seed
GnuGo-classical level 1 1. (± 0 ) .995 (± 0.002 )
GnuGo-classical level 2 1. (± 0 ) .995 (± 0.002 )
GnuGo-classical level 3 1. (± 0 ) .99 (± 0.002 )
GnuGo-classical level 4 1. (± 0 ) 1. (± 0 )
GnuGo-classical level 5 1. (± 0 ) 1. (± 0 )
GnuGo-classical level 6 1. (± 0 ) 1. (± 0 )
GnuGo-classical level 7 .73 (± .013 ) .061 (± .004 )
GnuGo-classical level 8 .73 (± .013 ) .106 (± .006 )
GnuGo-classical level 9 .73 (± .013 ) .095 (± .006 )
GnuGo-classical level 10 .73 (± .013 ) .07 (± .004 )
400 simulations. The BestArm approach was applied with a
100x100 learning matrix, corresponding to seeds {1, . . . , 100}
for Black and seeds {1, . . . , 100} for White.
Then, we tested the performance against GnuGo “classical”,
i.e. the non-MCTS version of GnuGo; this is a really different
AI with different playing style. We got positive results as
shown in Table II. Results are presented for Black; for White
the BestArm had a negligible impact.
B. Transfer: validation by a MCTS with long thinking time
Figure 9 provides a summary of differences between moves
chosen (at least with some probability) by the original al-
gorithm, and the ones chosen in the same situation by the
algorithm with optimized seed. These situations are the 8 first
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(a) Game of Go: Black
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(b) Game of Go: White
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(c) Game of Chess: White
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(d) Game of Chess: Black
Fig. 6: Game of Go and Chess. Losing rate of UCBT-portfolio, versus the online learning time, for (i) Nash-Portfolio (red
line) (ii) Uniform portfolio (dotted blue line) (iii) each option independently (stars). X-axis: log2(number of iterations of UCBT
(i.e. number of played games for learning). Y-axis: frequency at which the game is lost. Experiments reproduced 1 000 times.
Standard deviations ≤ 10−4. Learning is visible in the sense that curves essentially decrease.
Fig. 9: Comparison between moves played by BestArm-MCTS
(top) and the original MCTS algorithm (bottom) in the same
situations.
differences between games played by the original GnuGo and
by the GnuGo with our best seed.
We use GnugoStrong, i.e. Gnugo with a larger number of
simulations, for checking if Seed 59 leads to better moves.
GnugoStrong is precisely defined as “gnugo –monte-carlo –
mc-games-per-level 100000 –level 1”. We provide below some
situations in which Seed 59 (top) proposes a move different
from the original Gnugo with the same number of simulations.
Gnugo is not deterministic; therefore this is simple the 8 first
differences found in our sample of games (we played games
until we find 8 differences).
We consider that GnugoStrong concludes that a situation is
a win (resp. loss) if, over 5 games played from this situation,
we always get a win (resp. loss). The conclusions from this
GnugoStrong experiment (8 situations) are as follows, for the
8 situations above respectively:
1) GnugoStrong prefers Top; Bottom is considered as a
12
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(a) Game of Havannah: Black
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(b) Game of Havannah: White
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(c) Game of Batoo: Black
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(d) Game of Batoo: White
Fig. 7: Game of Havannah and Batoo. Losing rate of UCBT-portfolio, versus the online learning time, against (i) Nash-
Portfolio (red line) (ii) Uniform portfolio (dotted blue line) (iii) each option independently (stars). X-axis: log2(number of
iterations of UCBT (i.e. number of played games for learning). Y-axis: frequency at which the game is lost. Experiments
reproduced 1 000 times, standard deviations ≤ 10−4. Learning is visible in the sense that curves essentially decrease.
loss.
2) Here black moves are the same up to symmetries. Both
are considered as wins for Black.
3) Both choices are considered as wins for Black.
4) Both choices are considered as wins for Black.
5) Both choices are considered as wins for Black.
6) GnugoStrong prefers Top; Bottom is considered as a
loss.
7) GnugoStrong prefers Top; Bottom is considered as a
loss.
8) GnugoStrong prefers Top; Bottom is considered as a
loss.
As a conclusion, in 4 cases, GnugoStrong prefers the
move chosen by the modified MCTS (with seed chosen by
BestArm). In 4 cases, moves are equivalent.
VII. ADDITIONAL EXPERIMENTS: SIMPLER TOOLS
We have seen that the Nash portfolio has some advantages
compared to the BestArm method, namely robustness against
a learning opponent. On the other hand, the Nash mechanism
induces a computational overhead and some implementation
complexity. Therefore, we here investigate the relative perfor-
mance of different methods:
• Nash portfolio.
• BestArm portfolio.
• BestHalf, which is a uniform random choice among
the options with performance better than the median
performance over the learning set. In other words, given
13
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(b) White
Fig. 8: Game of Go using different variants. Losing rate of UCBT-portfolio, versus the online learning time, against (i)
Nash-Portfolio (red line) (ii) Uniform portfolio (dotted blue line) (iii) each option independently (stars). X-axis: log2(number
of iterations of UCBT (i.e. number of played games for learning). Y-axis: frequency at which the game is lost. Experiments
reproduced 1 000 times, standard deviations ≤ 10−4. Learning is visible in the sense that curves essentially decrease. We see
that deterministic variants are quickly crushed. We see that the Nash portfolio resists better than the uniform portfolio.
the matrix M , it selects the rows i with sum
∑K
j=1Mi,j
above the median. These options (up to ties and rounding,
there are K/2 such options) are played with the same
probability.
• Uniform, i.e. randomly choosing the option.
• Exploiter, who “cheats” by choosing the best element in
its portfolio while knowing its performance against its
opponent. By definition, Exploiter can not play against
itself.
The four first are policies which can be used in real life.
The fifth one requires offline training, which is difficult in
a competition unless your opponent has shared his program.
All results are obtained with learning matrices distinct for
Black and White so that there is no overfitting bias.
Results are provided in Fig. 10 for Chess (portfolio of seeds)
and Go (portfolio of variants), 11 for Havannah and Batoo
(portfolio of seeds). As a conclusion:
• BestHalf is a good solution, performing similarly to Nash,
including in terms of results against Exploiter, whereas it
is very simple.
• The case of “variants” has non binary outputs; and,
consequently, it is less prone to overfitting; even BestArm
performs reasonably well against Exploiter.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We proposed three algorithms for combining policies:
• Three offline algorithms, namely the Nash-Portfolio, the
simpler BestHalf-portfolio which approximates Nash-
Portfolio quite well, and the Best Arm Portfolio. Given
a family of algorithms, or a single algorithm “exploded”
into several algorithms (by the use of random seeds or by
varying its parameterizations), they build, offline, a new
algorithm.
• The Bandit(UCBT)-Portfolio, which learns online, given
an opponent; this one is adaptive.
We tested them on Go, Chess, Havannah, Batoo. Other pub-
lications include experiments on Domineering, Atari, Break-
through [41]. A work on Tsumego has investigated the use of
seeds learnt online (see results comparing MCTS(1) to other
methods in [42]).
We have seen that:
• The Nash-Portfolio is more diversified than any of its
components in the sense that it is harder to learn against
(i.e. harder to exploit) than any of its components
and harder to learn against than the uniform-Portfolio.
Best Arm is less resilient (easy to exploit, converging
to 0% success rate against UCBT portfolio), though quite
efficient against the uniform-Portfolio.
• The UCBT-Portfolio can learn a combination until reach-
ing optimal exploitation of a stationary opponent (this is
mathematically guaranteed by properties of UCBT, which
is a consistent bandit algorithm in the discrete setting). In
particular, it defeated clearly each deterministic variants
in Fig. 6, reaching 100% winning rate. It also performs
quite well against the default policy, which is uniformly
randomized random seed. This shows that we can en-
hance a randomized algorithm a lot, just by biasing the
choice of the random seed. The Nash-Portfolio resists
much better (than uniform or Best Arm) to a UCBT-
portfolio, showing that the Nash portfolio is hard to
exploit. Best Arm is, by construction, the asymptotic
limit of UCBT learning against the uniform portfolio, and
against the original algorithm.
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The Nash-portfolio and Best Arm portfolio perform well
against the original GPP (Section V-A). Therefore our tools
provide an easy improvement on top of randomized algo-
rithms, or on top of variants of an algorithm. Results in Section
VI show the robustness of the results, in the sense that the
improved GPP is not only winning against the original GPP,
but it also has a better winning rate against other opponents
than the ones used in the learning.
The computational cost could potentially become an issue
when combining parameterizations (in Section IV-B - with
large computational cost because we averaged multiple games
for building the matrix). It is not the case for combining ran-
dom seeds (Section IV-A), where deterministic games are used
and therefore there is no point in duplicating games. It should
also be pointed out that solving Nash is fast, and if needs be,
we can further the speed of the computation using algorithms
that can -approximate a NE in sublinear time [30], [31] - so
that a number of games linear in max(K,K ′) log(KK ′)/2
(i.e. far less than the number K×K ′ of elements in the matrix)
is sufficient for a precision . Importantly, even in the case of
combining variants, all computational costs are offline, so that
there is no significant online computational overhead.
Results are threefold:
• An improvement in terms of playing strength measured
in direct games, as our Best Arm, the Best Half
policy suggested by a reviewer, and our Nash-Portfolio
all outperform the original randomized algorithm.
• An improvement in terms of eTeaching (use of our pro-
gram as a teaching tool); our UCBT-Portfolio algorithm
is adaptive and difficult to overfit. This does not involve
any additional computational power as UCBT is online
and has a negligible internal cost. This makes our UCBT
tool suitable for online learning.
• An improvement in terms of resilience; for learning size
at least 40 seeds, our Nash-Portfolio is harder to overfit
than any of its components and than the uniform portfolio
(in Fig. 6 - 8). At the end of the offline computation
of the Nash equilibrium, it is just a bias in the random
seed distribution, so the additional computational cost is
negligible. The non-intuitive key point in the “random
seed” part of this work is that biasing the random seed
has an impact.
Further work.
The easiest and most promising further work consists in
using fast approximate Nash equilibria, so that the full matrix
does not have to be computed. This should extend by far the
number K of arms that our method can handle. Another further
work is the use of discounted bandits for the UCBT bandit, so
that very old games have little influence on the current games
- this should bring improvements in terms of adaptivity, when
playing against a non-stationary opponent such as a human.
An infinite set of seeds should be considered in UCBT, so
that exact optimality might, asymptotically, be reached. An
adapted bandit algorithm already exists for such cases [43].
We have considered random seeds for whole runs; more
specialized representations are under work. The present work
might indeed be used for deterministic algorithms without any
parameterization: we might e.g. randomize the parameters of
an evaluation function used in an alpha-beta algorithm.
Acknowledgements
We are grateful to the Dagstuhl seminar for interesting
discussions around coevolution.
REFERENCES
[1] P. E. Utgoff, “Perceptron trees: A case study in hybrid concept repre-
sentations,” in National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 1988, pp.
601–606.
[2] D. W. Aha, “Generalizing from case studies: A case study,” in Proceed-
ings of the 9th International Workshop on Machine Learning. Morgan
Kaufmann Publishers Inc., 1992, pp. 1–10.
[3] E. Nudelman, K. Leyton-Brown, H. H. Hoos, A. Devkar, and Y. Shoham,
“Understanding random sat: beyond the clauses-to-variables ratio,” in
Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming CP 2004, M. Wal-
lace, Ed., vol. 3258 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer
Berlin / Heidelberg, 2004, pp. 438–452.
[4] L. Xu, F. Hutter, H. H. Hoos, and K. Leyton-Brown, “Hydra-mip:
automated algorithm configuration and selection for mixed integer
programming,” in RCRA Workshop on Experimental Evaluation of
Algorithms for Solving Problems with Combinatorial Explosion at the
International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), 2011.
[5] L. Kotthoff, “Algorithm selection for combinatorial search problems: A
survey,” AI Magazine, vol. 35, no. 3, pp. 48–60, 2014. [Online]. Avail-
able: http://www.aaai.org/ojs/index.php/aimagazine/article/view/2460
[6] ——, “Algorithm selection for combinatorial search problems: A sur-
vey,” AI Magazine, vol. 35, no. 3, pp. 48–60, 2014.
[7] A. R. KhudaBukhsh, L. Xu, H. H. Hoos, and K. Leyton-Brown,
“Satenstein: Automatically building local search SAT solvers from
components,” in IJCAI 2009, Proceedings of the 21st International
Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Pasadena, California,
USA, July 11-17, 2009, 2009, pp. 517–524. [Online]. Available:
http://ijcai.org/papers09/Papers/IJCAI09-093.pdf
[8] F. Hutter, H. H. Hoos, K. Leyton-Brown, and T. Stu¨tzle, “Paramils:
An automatic algorithm configuration framework,” J. Artif. Int.
Res., vol. 36, no. 1, pp. 267–306, Sep. 2009. [Online]. Available:
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1734953.1734959
[9] D. Bolme, J. Beveridge, B. Draper, P. Phillips, and Y. Lui,
“Automatically searching for optimal parameter settings using a genetic
algorithm,” in Computer Vision Systems, ser. Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, J. Crowley, B. Draper, and M. Thonnat, Eds. Springer
Berlin Heidelberg, 2011, vol. 6962, pp. 213–222. [Online]. Available:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-23968-7 22
[10] B. Bouzy, M. Me´tivier, and D. Pellier, “Hedging algorithms and repeated
matrix games,” in ECML Workshop on Machine Learning and Data
Mining In and Around Games, 2011.
[11] M. Swiechowski and J. Mandziuk, “Self-adaptation of playing strategies
in general game playing,” IEEE Trans. Comput. Intellig. and AI in
Games, vol. 6, no. 4, pp. 367–381, 2014. [Online]. Available:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TCIAIG.2013.2275163
[12] J. Borrett and E. Tsang, “Towards a formal framework for compar-
ing constraint satisfaction problem formulations,” University of Essex,
Colchester, UK, Tech. Rep. CSM-264, 1996.
[13] V. Vassilevska, R. Williams, and S. L. M. Woo, “Confronting hardness
using a hybrid approach,” in Proceedings of the seventeenth annual
ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm. ACM, 2006, pp. 1–
10.
[14] L. Xu, F. Hutter, H. H. Hoos, and K. Leyton-Brown, “Satzilla: Portfolio-
based algorithm selection for sat.” J. Artif. Intell. Res.(JAIR), vol. 32,
pp. 565–606, 2008.
[15] P. O. Stalph, M. Ebner, M. Michel, B. Pfaff, and R. Benz, “Multiob-
jective evolution of a fuzzy controller in a sewage treatment plant,” in
GECCO, C. Ryan and M. Keijzer, Eds., pp. 535–536.
[16] S. Teraoka, T. Ushio, and T. Kanazawa, “Voronoi coverage control with
time-driven communication for mobile sensing networks with obstacles.”
in CDC-ECE. IEEE, 2011, pp. 1980–1985. [Online]. Available:
http://dblp.uni-trier.de/db/conf/cdc/cdc2011.html#TeraokaUK11
15
[17] O. Lejri and M. Tagina, “Representation in case-based reasoning applied
to control reconfiguration,” in Advances in Data Mining. Applications
and Theoretical Aspects, ser. Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
P. Perner, Ed. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2012, vol. 7377, pp. 113–120.
[Online]. Available: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-31488-9 10
[18] D. L. Saint-Pierre and O. Teytaud, “Nash and the Bandit Approach for
Adversarial Portfolios,” in CIG 2014 - Computational Intelligence in
Games, ser. Computational Intelligence in Games, IEEE. Dortmund,
Germany: IEEE, Aug. 2014, pp. 1–7. [Online]. Available: https:
//hal.inria.fr/hal-01077628
[19] R. Gaudel, J.-B. Hoock, J. Pe´rez, N. Sokolovska, and O. Teytaud, “A
principled method for exploiting opening books,” in Computers and
Games. Springer, 2011, pp. 136–144.
[20] S. Kadioglu, Y. Malitsky, A. Sabharwal, H. Samulowitz, and M. Sell-
mann, “Algorithm selection and scheduling,” in 17th International
Conference on Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming,
2011, pp. 454–469.
[21] M. Gagliolo and J. Schmidhuber, “Learning dynamic algorithm portfo-
lios,” vol. 47, no. 3-4, 2006, pp. 295–328.
[22] W. Armstrong, P. Christen, E. McCreath, and A. P. Rendell, “Dynamic
algorithm selection using reinforcement learning,” in International Work-
shop on Integrating AI and Data Mining, 2006, pp. 18–25.
[23] V. Nagarajan, L. S. Marcolino, and M. Tambe, “Every team deserves
a second chance: Identifying when things go wrong (student abstract
version),” in 29th Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI 2015),
Texas, USA, 2015.
[24] R. A. Valenzano, N. R. Sturtevant, J. Schaeffer, K. Buro, and
A. Kishimoto, “Simultaneously searching with multiple settings: An
alternative to parameter tuning for suboptimal single-agent search
algorithms,” in Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on
Automated Planning and Scheduling, ICAPS 2010, Toronto, Ontario,
Canada, May 12-16, 2010, R. I. Brafman, H. Geffner, J. Hoffmann,
and H. A. Kautz, Eds. AAAI, 2010, pp. 177–184. [Online]. Available:
http://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/ICAPS/ICAPS10/paper/view/1457
[25] K. Hoki, T. Kaneko, A. Kishimoto, and T. Ito, “Parallel dovetailing
and its application to depth-first proof-number search,” ICGA Journal,
vol. 36, no. 1, pp. 22–36, 2013.
[26] J. V. Neumann and O. Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic
Behavior. Princeton University Press, 1944. [Online]. Available:
http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/neumann44a.pdf
[27] J. Nash, “The bargaining problem,” Econometrica, vol. 18, no. 2, pp.
155–162, April 1950.
[28] V. N. Vapnik, The Nature of Statistical Learning. Springer Verlag,
1995.
[29] K. Gale and Tucker, “Linear programming and the theory of games,” in
Activity Analysis of Production and Allocation, Koopmans, Ed. Wiley,
1951, ch. XII.
[30] M. D. Grigoriadis and L. G. Khachiyan, “A sublinear-time randomized
approximation algorithm for matrix games,” Operations Research Let-
ters, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 53–58, Sep 1995.
[31] P. Auer, N. Cesa-Bianchi, Y. Freund, and R. E. Schapire, “Gambling
in a rigged casino: the adversarial multi-armed bandit problem,” in
Proceedings of the 36th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer
Science. IEEE Computer Society Press, Los Alamitos, CA, 1995, pp.
322–331.
[32] H. Samulowitz and R. Memisevic, “Learning to solve QBF,” in Proceed-
ings of the 22nd National Conference on Artificial Intelligence. AAAI,
2007, pp. 255–260.
[33] T. Lai and H. Robbins, “Asymptotically efficient adaptive allocation
rules,” Advances in Applied Mathematics, vol. 6, pp. 4–22, 1985.
[34] P. Auer, N. Cesa-Bianchi, and P. Fischer, “Finite time analysis of the
multiarmed bandit problem,” Machine Learning, vol. 47, no. 2/3, pp.
235–256, 2002.
[35] J. Audibert, R. Munos, and C. Szepesva´ri, “Exploration-exploitation
tradeoff using variance estimates in multi-armed bandits,” Theor.
Comput. Sci., vol. 410, no. 19, pp. 1876–1902, 2009. [Online].
Available: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2009.01.016
[36] R. Coulom, “Efficient Selectivity and Backup Operators in Monte-
Carlo Tree Search,” In P. Ciancarini and H. J. van den Herik, editors,
Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Computers and
Games, Turin, Italy, pp. 72–83, 2006.
[37] B. Robertie, “Backgammon,” Inside Backgammon, vol. 2, no. 1, p. 4,
1980.
[38] M. Campbell, A. J. Hoane Jr, and F.-h. Hsu, “Deep Blue,” Artificial
intelligence, vol. 134, no. 1, pp. 57–83, 2002.
[39] S. Gelly and D. Silver, “Combining online and offline knowledge in
UCT,” in ICML ’07: Proceedings of the 24th international conference
on Machine learning. New York, NY, USA: ACM Press, 2007, pp.
273–280.
[40] Tao Uct Sig. (2014) Tao games axis. [Online]. Available: http:
//www.lri.fr/∼teytaud/games.html
[41] T. Cazenave, J. Liu, and O. Teytaud, “The rectangular seeds of domi-
neering, atari-go and breakthrough,” in Computational Intelligence and
Games (CIG), 2015 IEEE Congress on. IEEE, 2015.
[42] D. L. St-Pierre, J. Liu, and O. Teytaud, “Nash reweighting of monte
carlo simulations: Tsumego,” in Evolutionary Computation (CEC), 2015
IEEE Congress on. IEEE, 2015, pp. 1458–1465.
[43] Y. Wang, J. Audibert, and R. Munos, “Algorithms for
infinitely many-armed bandits,” in Advances in Neural Information
Processing Systems 21, Proceedings of the Twenty-Second
Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems,
Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, December 8-11, 2008,
2008, pp. 1729–1736. [Online]. Available: http://papers.nips.cc/paper/
3452-algorithms-for-infinitely-many-armed-bandits
16
1020304050
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
besthalf
vs
 b
es
ta
rm
1020304050
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
exploit
vs
 n
a
sh
1020304050
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
exploit
vs
 b
es
ta
rm
1020304050
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
exploit
vs
 b
es
th
al
f
1020304050
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
uniform
vs
 n
a
sh
1020304050
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
uniform
vs
 b
es
ta
rm
1020304050
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
uniform
vs
 b
es
th
al
f
10 20 30 40 50
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
bestarm
vs
 n
a
sh
1020304050
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
besthalf
vs
 n
a
sh
1020304050
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
uniform
vs
 e
xp
lo
it
4 6 810121416
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
besthalf
vs
 b
es
ta
rm
4 6 810121416
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
exploit
vs
 n
a
sh
4 6 810121416
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
exploit
vs
 b
es
ta
rm
4 6 810121416
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
exploit
vs
 b
es
th
al
f
4 6 810121416
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
uniform
vs
 n
a
sh
4 6 810121416
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
uniform
vs
 b
es
ta
rm
4 6 810121416
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
uniform
vs
 b
es
th
al
f
4 6 8 10121416
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
bestarm
vs
 n
a
sh
4 6 810121416
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
besthalf
vs
 n
a
sh
4 6 810121416
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
uniform
vs
 e
xp
lo
it
Fig. 10: Top: Chess, portfolio of random seeds: performance of various portfolio algorithms (see text) against others, depending
on the number of options in the solver (x-axis). Bottom: Go, portfolio of GnuGo variants: performance of various portfolio
algorithms (see text) against others, depending on the number of options in the solver (x-axis).
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Fig. 11: Top: Havannah, portfolio of random seeds: performance of various portfolio algorithms (see text) against others,
depending on the number of options in the solver (x-axis). Bottom: Batoo, portfolio of random seeds: performance of various
portfolio algorithms (see text) against others, depending on the number of options in the solver (x-axis).
